A more applicable message than the post I previously posted, Russians penetrated U.S. voter systems, says top U.S. official.
Without saying so, this is a call for action by the US government, not just Congress and/or the White House. This is a call for action at every level, by all concerned.
BY FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR — 01/31/18 11:00 AM EST
January marked the first anniversary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s designation of elections as “critical infrastructure,” placing them into the category of other physical or virtual sectors — such as food, water and energy — considered so crucial that their protection is necessary to our national security. Naming “elections” as a critical infrastructure sub-sector was a key action taken by then-Secretary Jeh Johnson following an Intelligence Community report about ways Russia sought to meddle in the 2016 elections via a variety of hacking tactics aimed at election offices, voter databases and our larger digital democracy.
At the time, I was serving as DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis — and I was encouraged greatly by the critical infrastructure move. Voting administration is a state and local responsibility, but these entities often are overburdened, under-resourced and not exactly versed in Kremlin-based cyber crimes. The announcement reflected a new reality that election security is national security — and it provided enhanced capabilities for the feds to coordinate on election cyber threats.
However, since that optimistic moment 13 months ago, there has been unwillingness at the highest levels of the federal government to act.
On Capitol Hill, it’s taken a year for the Secure Elections Act (S. 2261), to be introduced. Although a positive first step toward ensuring that states have grants and other support to protect their voting systems, the bill’s future is unclear beyond the six bipartisan co-sponsors backing it.
At DHS, scores of mid-level staff — especially within the National Protection and Programs directorate — are working to answer state and local election officials requesting cyber assistance, while at the same time gathering what limited resources exist to prepare for 2018. But these folks are operating minus top cover from the White House or other cabinet-level leaders, many of whom continue to eschew that Russia is a concern altogether.
As I consider possible reasons for this federal lack of leadership, it appears the fear of attaching oneself to the politics of the past election — rather than tackling the real challenges of the upcoming one — emerges as the most plausible explanation.
For one, it’s not for lack of threat. The vulnerabilities within our democratic infrastructure are deepening every day. In June, DHS announced that voting systems and registration databases in at least 21 states had been the aim of Russian hacking attempts in 2016. Last fall, across the pond, the Brits laid claim that the same Russia-based Twitter accounts that targeted the 2016 U.S. election also employed divisive rhetoric to influence the Brexit referendum. Even as recently as November, news emerged that Russian bots flooded the Federal Communications Commission’s public comment systems — an important democratic forum for Americans to voice opinions — during the net-neutrality debate, generating millions of fake comments.
Federal procrastination is also seemingly not tied to lack of pressure. It is true that DHS’s initial offers for cyber assistance were not embraced by state and locals in past elections. But since last year, there’s been a backlog of requests pouring in. Meanwhile, local election directors such as Cook County, Illinois’ Noah Praetz, have taken it upon themselves to develop election cybersecurity plans, despite no federal backing. Even the hacker community — traditionally allergic to Washington — has been raising the alarm on election security. For example, DEFCON, the world’s largest hacker conference, held an educational voting machine hacking demonstration last summer to show how susceptible election equipment is to cyber attack.
Finally, I surmise absent response is not a factor of the arduous process that is federal policymaking. Historically, when a national security threat to America is imminent, I’ve seen leaders act swiftly, honorably and without regard for politics. In this case, we have waning time to act: The 2018 election season is weeks away with primaries starting in March in Illinois and Texas. And when it comes to Russia’s goal of undermining democracy, they’re not likely to take this cycle off. Indeed, they will most likely apply the lessons of 2016 with a more calculated approach.
After 47 years in working in national security — much of that spent in the military and federal government — I respect the evolving threats facing democracy today. Yet the urgent work at the state and local level to prepare for future elections will be insufficient if it is not fully matched and funded by the federal government.
With new leaders, including DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, assuming the helm, this is a moment to choose national defense over politics. A window, albeit closing, exists to support state and locals — along with mid-level civil servants — focused on the problem.
In the vital cause to reassure Americans that their democracy can withstand outside attacks, our enemies are counting on political division and chaotic discourse. I encourage leaders at every level to leverage the best of our national security resources, unite and then prove them wrong.
Francis X. Taylor, a senior advisor at the security consulting firm Cambridge Global Advisors in Washington, is the former under secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. He also served as the former head of diplomatic security with the State Department and is a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general.