Anonymous expert compilation, analysis, and reporting.
The debate is beginning to dissipate in the global MSM, the only persistent US traffic being the syndicated reissues of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette attempting to amplify the NYT’s false claims.
Poroshenko’s statement below, endorsed by the US Embassy in Kyiv.
UATV post a 13 minute interview with Joshua H. Pollack, AB, MA, Editor of the The Nonproliferation Review, who does a very good survey of the range of opinions on the DPRK’s ICBM technology. He does not endorse the NYT publication.
Russia-centric SpaceNews.com produced a quite long essay by Moscow based Matthew Bodner recounting events, and expressing dismay at the social media trolling of Elleman by Ukrainian trolls (Bodner is not an ICBM expert). He cites two Russian analysts, and Michael Kofman in the US, who expresses great scepticism about the Russian IW/IO dimension to this argument – Kofman has of course been often visible in the Russia-Ukraine debate and generally appears to favour appeasement – he is not expert in ICBM tech nor IW/IO and not really qualified to comment here.
Public data on the Soviet R-36 / 8K67 / SS-9 SCARP shows an ICBM with three RD-250 series engines, and vernier thruster controls, compared to the much smaller DRPK Hwasong-14 ICBM with only one engine in this class. The DPRK design is clearly unique, and appears to be a fusion of a uniquely North Korean airframe, and Soviet propulsion components.
There has been no comment as yet from the NYT management or the NYT authors. Their basis and indeed motives for falsely accusing the Ukrainians remain to be explained.
The United States Embassy in Ukraine welcomed Ukraine’s “thorough” approach to investigating recent reports on the alleged supply of missile engines to North Korea, the embassy’s press service wrote on Twitter. News 18 August from UNIAN.
Joshua H. Pollack comments on the Ukraine-North Korea rocket technology allegations in the recent New York Times publication. _ Follow UATV English: Facebook…
MOSCOW — In the days that followed Monday’s report in The New York Times that North Korea may have illicitly procured advanced Soviet-era rocket engines from Ukraine, the response out of the post-Soviet nation could best be described as trolling. Not long after the report was published, outraged Ukrainian social media users directed their outrage at the source of the allegations: Michael Elleman, a missile defense expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The New York Times story referenced in detail a report published by Elleman that same day, in which he noted apparent similarities between North Korea’s new missile engines and those once produced by Yuzmash, the Ukrainian rocket factory that builds the Zenit, Dnepr and Cyclone satellite launchers and the main stage of Orbital ATK’s Antares rocket. Rather than challenge Elleman’s argument, Ukrainian social media users quickly made things personal. Freelance investigators scoured his Facebook and Twitter profiles to find evidence that Elleman was a Russian agent peddling propaganda. “It was extremely interesting to read the Facebook page of someone who, in The New York Times story, was presented as a rocket expert,” Artem Sokolenko, the head of a communications firm in Kiev wrote on Facebook Sunday. “He does not like to show his wife on his page, but there are some photos,” Sokolonko wrote, sharing photos purportedly of Elleman’s Russian wife, Tatyana, dressed in a Russian military uniform — one that was obviously not her own. Elleman was the head of a cooperative nuclear missile dismantlement program in Chelyabinsk, Russia, from 1995 to 2001, and is a respected expert in the field of arms control and missile defense. “The initial Ukrainian response was unhelpful,” Michael Kofman, an expert in Russian military affairs at the Virginia-based CNA think tank told SpaceNews. “They blamed the expert and then Russian information warfare, which had nothing to do with the matter,” Kofman said. “After categorical denials, only now are they launching an investigation to see if there was any connection.” On Wednesday, two days after the reports were published, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko finally stepped up with a proactive response. “No matter how absurd the accusations,” Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko wrote on his Facebook page Wednesday, “as responsible partners…we shall carefully verify…the alleged supply of missile engines … to North Korea.” Poroshenko ordered Yuzhmash, the Ukrainian rocket firm in question, along with state investigators, to conduct a thorough investigation into the claims and report back to him. The report is expected imminently.
The wall around the Yuzhmash rocket factory in east Ukraine is in places overgrown with weeds, a sign of hard times at a plant which a new study says could be the source of engines that power North Korean missiles.
Ukraine’s Ambassador to Japan Ihor Kharchenko denied Friday a recent claim that a state-owned plant in his country had leaked engine technology possibly used in a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile.
The New York Times story, which made a huge mistake blaming Ukraine for supplying rocket engines to North Korea, has not been retracted, no apology issued, nor a statement declaring the story wrong been issued. The article has been soundly disproven, yet the NYT is holding its ground. </end editorial> Elleman also said that there…
Elleman also said that there is no evidence of involvement in the supply of engines to the Ukrainian authorities
Struggle against fake information about events in Ukraine
As the story that started from the NYT article about Ukraine allegedly supplying missile engines to North Korea was in full swing, a Russian prankster duo gave a call to the director of Ukraine’s missile plant Yuzhmash, attempting to pry out dirty little secrets. They tried hard, but no secrets were revealed. Serhiy Voit essentially reiterated the official position of Ukraine and its famous engine producers, Yuzhmash and the Yuzhnoye construction bureau: there is no way Ukraine could supply or leak rocket engines to North Korea. However, he said that the Soviet technology could have come to North Korea through China or Russia. The Russian prankster duo Vladimir “Vovan” Kuznetsov and Alexei “Lexus” Stolyarov dialed up Serhiy Voit. Pretending to be Ukraine’s Head of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksandr Turchynov, “Vovan” spoke to Serhiy Voit in Russian, and attempted to provoke the plant director to “tell it how it really is” and pry out the “weakest link” that could be blamed. What Voit told coincided with official state communication on the scandal and the official press releases of the Yuzhmash missile plant and the Yuzhnoye construction bureau:
Statement by Yuzhnoye Press Center on Recent Publications by IISS and the New York Times Alleging Cooperation Between Ukraine and North Korea – SpaceRef
The R-36 (8K67) ballistic missile, known in the west as the SS-9 SCARP, was a a two-stage, tandem, storable liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile-uses an all-inertial guidance system and according to Western estimates had a CEP of 0.4 to 0.5 nm. The R-36 missile was derived from the experience gained during the development of the R-16 missile, and the first stage of the two missiles are very similar. The propulsion system of the first stage R-36 consisted of three open-cycle rocket engines with two combustion chambers and a four-chambered control engine. The second stage comprised a single engine with two combustion chambers. The oxidizer and fuel tanks of the second stage was the first Soviet ICBM to incorporated a common bulkhead, all propellant tanks were synchronously drained. Asymmetrical dimethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide were used as propellants, and during flight gaseous combustion products were used to pressurize the fuel tanks. In order to increase accuracy the guidance system was originally planned to encompass a combination of an autonomous inertial system and radio-control. However, the deployed missile only disposed of an autonomous, inertial guidance/control system that provided the required accuracy. The SS-9’s combination of high accuracy and yield constituted a convincing threat for the American ICBMs for the first time. The SS-9 was viewed in the United States as specifically designed to attack American Minuteman ICBM Launch Control Centers (LCCs), which initially were the “Achilles heel” of the Minuteman system, as 100 LCCs controlled all 1,000 Minuteman missiles. However, by 1969, as a result of redundant internetting of Minuteman silos and a backup airborne launch control system, the LCCs no longer were the “achilles heel” of Minuteman, so building one SS-9 for each Minuteman silo required MIRVed systems.
The following editorial appeared in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.Ukraine is virtually an “anything goes” zone for American entrepreneurs
Ukraine is virtually an “anything goes” zone for American entrepreneurs — as well as for people like the North Koreans. That idea has been reinforced by news reports that a