Cybersecurity · cyberwar · Information operations · Information Warfare · Russia

Tainted Leaks: Disinformation and Phishing With a Russian Nexus


 I include the first half of the article here, to drive traffic to the Citizen Lab website. 

Excellent report, excellent investigation, excellent details!

</end editorial>



May 25, 2017

Categories: Adam Hulcoop, John Scott-Railton, Matt Brooks, Reports and Briefings, Ron Deibert

By: Adam Hulcoop, John Scott-Railton, Peter Tanchak, Matt Brooks, and Ron Deibert

Read Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert’s blog post on the report.

Media coverage: Financial Times.

“Every external operation is first and foremost a domestic one: the single most important role of the agencies is to secure the regime.” — Mark Galeotti on Russian foreign intelligence

Key Points

  • Documents stolen from a prominent journalist and critic of the Russian government were manipulated and then released as a “leak” to discredit domestic and foreign critics of the government. We call this technique “tainted leaks.”
  • The operation against the journalist led us to the discovery of a larger phishing operation, with over 200 unique targets spanning 39 countries (including members of 28 governments). The list includes a former Russian Prime Minister, members of cabinets from Europe and Eurasia, ambassadors, high ranking military officers, CEOs of energy companies, and members of civil society.
  • After government targets, the second largest set (21%) are members of civil society including academics, activists, journalists, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
  • We have no conclusive evidence that links these operations to a particular Russian government agency; however, there is clear overlap between our evidence and that presented by numerous industry and government reports concerning Russian-affiliated threat actors.

Summary

This report describes an extensive Russia-linked phishing and disinformation campaign. It provides evidence of how documents stolen from a prominent journalist and critic of Russia was tampered with and then “leaked” to achieve specific propaganda aims. We name this technique “tainted leaks.” The report illustrates how the twin strategies of phishing and tainted leaks are sometimes used in combination to infiltrate civil society targets, and to seed mistrust and disinformation. It also illustrates how domestic considerations, specifically concerns about regime security, can motivate espionage operations, particularly those targeting civil society. The report is organized into four parts described below:

PART 1: HOW TAINTED LEAKS ARE MADE describes a successful phishing campaign against David Satter, a high-profile journalist. We demonstrate how material obtained during this campaign was selectively released with falsifications to achieve propaganda aims. We then highlight a similar case stemming from an operation against an international grantmaking foundation, headquartered in the United States, in which their internal documents were selectively released with modifications to achieve a disinformation end.  These “tainted leaks” were demonstrated by comparing original documents and emails with what Russia-linked groups later published.  We conclude that the tainting likely has roots in Russian domestic policy concerns, particularly around offsetting and discrediting what are perceived as “outside” or “foreign” attempts to destabilize or undermine the Putin regime.

PART 2: A TINY DISCOVERY describes how the operation against Satter led us to the discovery of a larger phishing operation, with over 200 unique targets. We identified these targets by investigating links created by the operators using the Tiny.cc link shortening service.  After highlighting the similarities between this campaign and those documented by previous research, we round out the picture on Russia-linked operations by showing how related campaigns that attracted recent media attention for operations during the 2016 United States presidential election also targeted journalists, opposition groups, and civil society.

PART 3: CONNECTIONS TO PUBLICLY REPORTED OPERATIONS outlines the connections between the campaigns we have documented and previous public reporting on Russia-linked operations. After describing overlaps among various technical indicators, we discuss the nuance and challenges surrounding attribution in relation to operations with a Russian nexus.

PART 4: DISCUSSION explores how phishing operations combined with tainted leaks were paired to monitor, seed disinformation, and erode trust within civil society. We discuss the implications of leak tainting and highlight how it poses unique and difficult threats to civil society.  We then address the often-overlooked civil society component of nation-state cyber espionage operations.

Introduction: Tainted Leaks & Civil Society Targets

Russia-linked cyber espionage campaigns, particularly those involving targeting around the 2016 U.S. elections, and more recently the 2017 French election, have dominated the media in recent months. As serious as these events are, often overlooked in both media and industry reports on cyber espionage is a critical and persistent victim group: global civil society.

A healthy, fully-functioning, and vibrant civil society is the antithesis of non-democratic rule, and as a consequence, powerful elites threatened by their actions routinely direct their powerful spying apparatuses toward civil society to infiltrate, anticipate, and even neutralize their activities. Unlike industry and government, however, civil society groups typically lack resources, institutional depth, and capacity to deal with these assaults. For different reasons, they also rarely factor into threat industry reporting or government policy around cyber espionage, and can be the silent, overlooked victims.

As with previous Citizen Lab reports, this report provides further evidence of the “silent epidemic” of targeted digital attacks on civil society, in this case involving widely reported Russian-affiliated cyber espionage operations. Our report underscores the domestic roots of these foreign operations, and how concerns over regime security and domestic legitimacy can factor into Russian threat modeling and espionage targeting, both at home and abroad.

Patient Zero for the Investigation: David Satter

Our investigation began with a single victim: David Satter, a high-profile journalist, Rhodes Scholar, and critic of the Kremlin. In 2013, Satter was banned from Russia, allegedly for “flagrant violations” of visa laws, but which most attribute to his investigative reporting on Russian autocracy. Satter is known for his book, Darkness at Dawn, which investigated the possible 1999 conspiracy involving the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in a series of bombings of Russian apartment buildings that was used as a justification for the second Chechen War and which facilitated the rise to power of Vladimir Putin.

On October 7, 2016 Satter fell victim to a targeted phishing campaign, and mistakenly entered his password on a credential harvesting site. Satter’s e-mails were stolen and later published selectively, and with intentional falsifications, as we will describe in this report. While we cannot conclusively attribute the theft of Satter’s emails to one particular threat actor, nor do we have concrete details on the process by which his stolen emails were falsified and made their way into the public domain, we uncover and analyze several pieces of evidence to help contextualize the tainted leaks, while at the same time linking the infiltration of his email to a much wider cyber espionage campaign that has a Russian nexus.

Tainted Leaks: Disinformation 2.0

Following the compromise of his account, Satter’s stolen e-mails were selectively modified, and then “leaked” on the blog of CyberBerkut, a self-described pro-Russian hacktivist group. This report introduces the term tainted leaks to describe the deliberate seeding of false information within a larger set of authentically stolen data.

We examine in detail how a report sent to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) about Radio Liberty’s Russian investigative reporting project (contained in the emails stolen from Satter) was carefully modified with false information prior to being released. We show how this manipulation created the false appearance that prominent Russian anti-corruption figures, including Alexei Navalny, were receiving foreign funding for their activities. (Alexei Navalny is a well-known Russian anti-corruption activist and opposition figure). We also note how the document was used in an effort to discredit specific reports about corruption among close associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In addition, whoever tainted the document also made reference to an article that had not yet been published at the time the document was “leaked.” This timing strongly suggests advance knowledge of the publication of an upcoming piece of investigative journalism concerning senior Russian officials and businessmen. Such information is likely to have been sensitive, and would not have been widely known. This may suggest that the operators had access to other, ongoing surveillance operations.

Once the tainted leak was released, Russian state-owned media and others reported that the document showed a CIA-backed conspiracy to start a “colour revolution” in Russia.1 The tainted leak was also reported as evidence that the reports on corruption within Putin’s inner circle represented part of a deliberate disinformation campaign on behalf of foreign interests.

The timing and substance of the tainting coincides with reported fears among Putin and his close associates that revelations about their wealth and its sources could trigger protests and uprisings within Russia, like those lead by Navalny in recent months and years.

Tainted leaks pose complex challenges to the victims of breaches, as well as representing a potent and troubling method of disinformation.  Part 1 describes the leak tainting in greater detail, and Part 4: Discussion provides an analysis of the risks posed by the tactic.

Pandora’s Un-Shortening: High Value Targets Emerge

While investigating the suspicious messages sent to Satter, we determined that Tiny.cc, the link-shortening service used by the operators to phish credentials, had predictable features that enabled us to discover some other links likely used by the same operators. We developed a technique to discover some of these links, and ultimately collected 223 malicious links representing 218 unique targets.2 We have been able to identify the real identity of approximately 85% of the targets. Of the set we identified, we found targets from at least 39 countries.

One thread that links the targets is that their professional activities connect them to issues where the Russian government has a demonstrated interest. In some cases, the targets are Russians, ranging from an ex-Prime Minister, to journalists who investigate corruption, to political activists.  Many more targets are from, posted to, or involved in extractive industries in countries and areas where the Russian government has an economic and strategic interest, such as former Soviet states.  Still others are likely to be working on issues on the other side of the negotiating table from Russia, whether as part of United Nations operations, NATO, or civil service.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the largest groups of targets are high-ranking military and government personnel and elected officials in Ukraine.

Figure 1: Map showing countries that targets of the phishing campaign are linked to [click for hi-res]

In other cases, for instance, the wife of a military attache, individuals appear to be targeted because of their proximity to high value targets. In others, we have identified a large number of individuals who appear to be targeted because they received support, in the form of a fellowship, from a particular US-based grantmaker.

Some notable target categories include:

  • Politicians, public servants and government officials from Afghanistan, Armenia, Austria, Cambodia, Egypt, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Peru, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam
  • Diplomatic personnel from numerous embassies, up to and including ambassador level, as well as their family members
  • Civil society members including very high profile critics of the Russian president, as well as journalists and academics
  • Senior members of the oil, gas, mining, and finance industries of the former Soviet states
  • United Nations officials
  • Military personnel from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States, as well as NATO officials

The discovery of so many other targets provides us with a window into the campaign’s structure, and objectives (Part 2 outlines how we discovered the targets). After government targets, the second largest set (21%) are members of civil society like academics, activists, journalists, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.

Figure 2: Some high-value targets who received phishing emails

The Importance of Civil Society Targets

The data presented in Figure 3 underscore the extent to which civil society groups are being targeted in numbers equivalent to those seen with the more classic ‘cyber espionage’ sector-aligned targets such as military, government, and industry.

Amongst the civil society targets, more than half were journalists, many of whom are prominent contributors to Russian language news outlets such as Vedomosti, Slon/Republic, Novaya Gazeta, and the BBC Russian Service.

While providing a detailed analysis of the civil society targets or an outline of their areas of activity would undoubtedly jeopardize their privacy, we can safely reflect on two notable patterns that emerge from such an analysis.

The first is that, like our first subject David Satter, several individuals from the target list were known for their public efforts towards shining a light on the Russian government and its activities. From publishing articles that outline fraud or corruption, to general activism in support of electoral reform, many of the civil society targets seem to have been singled out for the perception that their actions could pose a threat to the Putin regime.

Figure 3: Breakdown of discovered targets into broad categories

Another notable commonality found during analysis of the civil society targets of these campaigns is the near perfect alignment between their areas of activity and the geopolitical conflicts in which Russia is a known or suspected belligerent, or party to the conflict.  Specifically, the focus areas of the civil society targets span geographic boundaries, including conflict areas such as Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and others.

We also found that several dozen of the targeted individuals had as a thread in common that they had received a fellowship from a single funder focused on the region.

Notification

The large and diverse target group presented notification challenges. Our process for notifying potential victims involved the following considerations and steps:

  • For targets affiliated with governments or government-affiliated organizations (such as NATO or the United Nations), or businesses in a particular country, we passed information on targets’ names and email addresses to the relevant Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
  • If many targets shared an organizational affiliation, but not a single employer, we contacted that organization and worked with them to notify the individuals
  • We also provided a full list of targets to the targets’ e-mail provider.

Part 1: How Tainted Leaks Are Made

We examine how stolen materials from Satter’s inbox were turned into tainted leaks and released by CyberBerkut, and then examine a similar operation against the Open Society Foundations.

To make a clean comparison between real and fake, and illustrate exactly how tainting takes place, we obtained original, genuine documents and e-mails from David Satter, a victim of a breach, and compared them with the tainted versions. We then describe a prior case of tainted leaks: internal documents belonging to the Open Society Foundations were stolen, then later released with tainting similar to Satter’s, also by CyberBerkut.3

In both cases the breach victims were working with US-based organizations which had programs specializing in Russia. The tainting appeared to have two objectives: cause the programs to appear more subversive of Russia than they were, and discredit specific opposition individuals and groups critical of Russian President Putin and his confidants.

The Case of David Satter

On October 5, 2016, a phishing email was sent to the Gmail address of David Satter (See: Patient Zero: David Satter). This phishing email was crafted with a specific ruse designed to look like a security warning from Google, suggesting to the recipient that an unknown third-party has obtained their Gmail account password (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Phishing Email 1, mimicking a genuine message from Google

The phishing email is designed to trick the recipient into clicking on the ‘Change Password’ button. Clicking on this link would direct the victim’s web browser to a link hosted on the URL shortening service Tiny.cc. The operator disguised the link by using an open redirect hosted by Google. This open redirect allowed the operators to create a URL that, superficially, appears to be hosted by Google:

https://www.google.com/amp/tiny.cc/(redacted)

Unfortunately, the ultimate destination of this shortened URL was changed to a benign webpage before we were able to examine this phishing email.  However, as we will outline in Part 2 of this report, there is sufficient evidence available to suggest the original destination.

Analysis of the email headers revealed that the message was sent with the Russian email service Yandex, using email account g.mail2017[@]yandex.com.

A Second Phishing Email

Two days later, on October 7, 2016, Satter received a second email that used an identical deception to the first attempt detailed above.

As with Email 1, the google.com/amp/ redirect pointed to a URL hosted by Tiny.cc. Once again, similar to Email 1, Citizen Lab found that the originally configured redirection target for this link had been removed.

Analysis of the email headers in this second phishing attempt show that the message was sent with the web-based email service ‘mail.com’, using email account annaablony[@]mail.com.

Figure 5: Phishing Email 2

Unauthorized Access

On October 7 2016, shortly after receiving the email, Satter reports having clicked on the change password link in Email 2, and recalls being redirected to what he now realizes was in fact a credential phishing page which appeared to be a legitimate Google sign-in page.  Unfortunately, Satter had temporarily disabled 2-factor authentication on his account, making the compromise possible.

Shortly after entering his credentials, Satter’s Gmail account activity page recorded an unauthorized login event.  The data logged by Google indicated that the login session originated from an IP address in Romania (Figure 6).  In Part 2 we will show that the server associated with this IP address was also hosting the fake Google login page where Satter submitted his account credentials.  Thus it is likely that this malicious server was configured to automatically download the email contents from any compromised accounts (see Figure 7).

Figure 6: Screen grab from Google account activity page

In Part 2 of this report we will outline how the phishing links sent to Satter led us to discover a much wider campaign that included 218 distinct targets from government, industry, military, and civil society.  In the following section, we provide context concerning the disinformation campaign that was conducted around material stolen from Satter’s email account and published on the blog of CyberBerkut, a pro-Russian hacktivist collective.

Figure 7: How a phishing campaign against Satter became a tainted leaks operation

Analyzing a Tainted Leak

This section compares an original document obtained by Citizen Lab with a tainted document published online, and used as part of a disinformation campaign. We describe the tainting in detail, and analyse the likely objective.

Several documents from Satter’s emails were posted by CyberBerkut at the same time without observable manipulation. However, one document showed extensive evidence of tainting. The tainted leak was a report authored by Satter describing Radio Liberty’s Russian Investigative Reporting Project. The document was modified to make Satter appear to be paying Russian journalists and anti-corruption activists to write stories critical of the Russian Government. Importantly, we do not know the process through which the stolen document made its way from Satter’s inbox to the CyberBerkut release. In the CyberBerkut version, the document is posted as screen-captures, and thus lacks metadata.

Figure 8: CyberBerkut post dated October 22, 2016 showing the narrative accompanying the tainted leak document (highlighted with arrow). [Archived copy]

The original document lists a series of articles from Radio Liberty exclusively that are part of the project.  The articles concern a range of topics: history, economics, and politics.  Radio Liberty is a U.S. government international broadcaster, founded in 1951 to broadcast news and information into the Soviet Union.  It merged with Radio Free Europe in 1976, who now together are incorporated as a 501(c)(3), funded and overseen by the United States’ Broadcasting Board of Governors.The tainted document modifies the text to appear to be a report on a much larger (nonexistant) project to pay for articles by a range of authors, which would subsequently be published by a range of media outlets. The deceptively inserted articles, almost all of which are genuine publications, focus on corruption within Putin’s friends and inner circle. The work of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Putin critic, is repeatedly emphasized.  The full tainted document is in Appendix A.

Taint 1: Making reporting look like a secret influence operation

The operators modified the document’s scope in an attempt to create the appearance of a widespread media campaign. They did this by removing or modifying mentions of Radio Liberty throughout the document.

Figure 9: Text in red was removed, creating the impression of a wide media campaign, not the programming of a specific news source.

Other content, such as discussions of specific translators working for Radio Liberty are similarly removed to preserve the fiction.

Figure 10: The document was further tweaked to create the impression of a larger campaign. A note about a translator was also removed as it would contradict the impression

We believe that by removing specific references to Radio Liberty, the perpetrators are aiming to give the impression of a broader subversive campaign not limited to a single news organization. Doing so allows the perpetrators to falsely associate non-US funded organizations, such as independent NGOs, to appear to be linked as part of this larger, fictitious program.

Figure 11: Further tainting to remove mentions of Radio Liberty

Finally, a clause is deleted at the end of the document concerning the risks of writing “without the protection of a full time job” (Figure 11).  This deletion may simply be the tainters removing an inconvenient sentence that refers to Radio Liberty, but it also may be an attempt to make the  activity look more “cloak and dagger.”

Taint 2: Discrediting specific journalists and Kremlin critics

The original document included a list of 14 articles published as part of the Russian Investigative Project at Radio Liberty. The tainted document includes 24. The operators not only added to the list, but also tweaked the Radio Liberty articles to further the impression of a larger campaign.

Figure 12: Six of the ten added articles. All blue text was added to the original as part of the tainting.  The objective is to make these reports appear to have been supported by the project.

Ten additional articles were added.  Although the original list of publications covered a variety of themes, the added set primarily focuses on issues of corruption, and the wealth of those in Putin’s circle.  The articles, written for a range of publications, all share a theme: corruption and personal enrichment by those close to Putin and the Russian Government (See Appendix A).

Figure 13: People and Topics of articles added in the tainting.  Images: Wikipedia, Radio Free Europe, Reuters [click for hi-res]

Of special interest are the insertions of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian anti-corruption activist and opposition figure whose work, and Anti-corruption Foundation, receives widespread domestic and international attention. By repeatedly adding his reporting to the document, the tainting creates the appearance of “foreign” funding for his work.  This theme also figured prominently in the disinformation campaign surrounding the original publication, on October 22, 2016, of the tainted document by CyberBerkut (See: Disinformation Campaign Surrounding the Tainted Document).

Taint 3: Claimed foreknowledge

An article by Russian journalist Elena Vinogradova describing issues involving “senior Russian officials and businessmen” was also added as part of the tainting, which goes on to state that it will be published by Russian-language news service Vedomosti on October 24-25.4

Figure 14: Tainting that suggests the operators had advanced knowledge of a news report

This timing is significant as the original CyberBerkut publication of the tainted document occurred on October 22 2016, slightly before this date.

The apparent foreknowledge suggests that the individuals responsible for the tainting had advance knowledge of the content and publication date of a piece of investigative journalism, which may mean the operators had access to intelligence or surveillance reports concerning the activities of the Elena Vinogradova.

We identified at least one individual among the set of targets of the phishing campaign whose account might have provided this information, however we were not able to confirm a compromise.

Importantly, we were not able to find concrete evidence of the publication of an article matching the description added in the tainting. It is possible that existence of the article was a fabrication, or the result of misplaced speculation by the individuals responsible for the tainting.

Taint 4: Modifying the Time Frame and Supporting Details

The timeframe and number of publications are increased, perhaps to give the impression of a longer and more intense campaign. Changes are also made to accommodate a wide range of articles not published by Radio Liberty but by other parties.

Figure 14: Dates and numbers changed to accommodate ten more articles

Figure 15: Dates and numbers changed to accommodate ten more articles

Text that mentions specific dates in the original document that would not accommodate the articles that have been falsely added is also changed to support the new fiction.

Disinformation Campaign Surrounding the Tainted Document

The tainted version of the stolen document was released online by CyberBerkut, which represents itself as a group of pro-Russian hacktivists. CyberBerkut provided the framing narrative for the tainted document in a post on October 22, 2016: they were releasing the document to provide evidence that the United States was attempting to support a “colour revolution” in Russia. In the CyberBerkut narrative, David Satter was an agent directing the publication of articles critical of the Russian government.

Figure 15: RIA Novosti, Russia’s state operated news agency, reporting on the Cyber Berkut tainted leak

Figure 16: RIA Novosti, Russia’s state operated news agency, reporting the Cyber Berkut’s release of the tainted leaks

Russia’s state operated news agency RIA Novosti, as well as Sputnik Radio, picked up the narrative, and gave voice to a number of sources who claimed that the “leak” was evidence that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was attempting to foment a “colour revolution.”  The document was cited in a RIA Novosti report as providing evidence of “over 20” reports intended to discredit the Russian president, and his entourage. The “colour revolution” narrative was echoed in this SM News report, and by Vesti.lv, among others.

Meanwhile, other Russian-language sources claimed that the document discredited Navalny’s Anti-corruption Foundation by showing that its articles were actually ordered by David Satter.

The Open Society Foundations Case

In 2015, the Open Society Foundations (OSF) experienced a breach of confidential data.  Materials from this breach were released by CyberBerkut in November 2015 and, much later, on the “leak” branded site DC Leaks, alongside a wide range of materials stolen from other organizations. DC Leaks worked directly with some online outlets, and provided exclusive access to their materials to some, as well as achieving substantial media impact.

The redundant releases enable a comparison of documents between the two leaks using public materials. The DC Leaks dump included the release of untainted stolen documents that had been previously released as part of a tainted leak by Cyber Berkut.  An article in Foreign Policy used this dump to identify several cases of leak tainting. We were able to verify each of their observations, as well as identifying additional elements of tainting.

We then contacted OSF’s IT staff, who provided us with the original genuine documents which we were able to use as the basis for further comparisons, and to authenticate the documents posted on DC Leaks. Taken together, the tainting appears designed to create the impression that several groups and media outlets, including Alexei Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption, are supported by OSF.

As with the Satter case, the tainting appears to have a primarily domestic focus, and to be aimed at de-legitimizing figures like Navalny by making it appear that they are the recipients of illicit, foreign funding.  This is a view that Navalny, one of the targets of the tainting, has also expressed to Foreign Policy.

A Budget Document

First, CyberBerkut released a tainted budget document to make it appear as if OSF was funding Alexei Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption.

Figure 16: Tainted Budget Document: the second row was added to make it appear as if OSF was funding Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption

Figure 17: Tainted Budget Document: the second row was added to make it appear as if OSF was funding Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption

The tainters may have been working quickly, resulting in a small error, in which a dollar amount was substituted for “Approved Date.”

Proposed Strategy Document

Second, a proposed funding strategy document was similarly modified to include the Foundation for Fighting Corruption in a list of groups to receive OSF support.

Figure 17: Proposed Strategy Document showing the location where the tainted document is modified to include mention of the Foundation for Fighting Corruption.

Figure 18: Proposed Strategy Document showing the location where the tainted document is modified to include mention of the Foundation for Fighting Corruption

The tainting resumed later in the document, when several media outlets (Echo Moscow, RosBusinessConsulting, and Vedomosti)  were also added to the document, apparently to create the perception that they had received the support of OSF.

Figure 18: A second section in same document showing once more how several media outlets, including Echo Moscow, RosBusinessConsulting, and Vedomosti have been added.

Figure 19: A second section in the same document showing once more how several media outlets, including Echo Moscow, RosBusinessConsulting, and Vedomosti have been added.

The second instance of tainting in the strategy document also introduced a slight grammatical error when the tainters neglected to remove “an” before changing “news site” to the plural “news sites.”

Document Addressing the NGO Law

Finally, in a document addressing grantees and Russia’s NGO law, tainting was again performed to add Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption. The tainting also purported to show the foundation receiving money via Yandex, a widely-used Russian platform offering an online payment service.

Figure 19: Tainted document, once more showing the addition of Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption

Figure 20: Tainted document, once more showing the addition of Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption

Taken together, both the tainted document stolen from David Satter, and the tainted OSF documents paint a picture of a competent adversary working to achieve several objectives, including discrediting domestic critics of Russia’s government and president, while simultaneously attempting to embarrass foreign funders with activities in Russia. In Part 4 we discuss the significance of tainted leaks as a disinformation technique.

Part 2: A Tiny Discovery

Beginning with the shortened link sent to David Satter, we identified a predictable feature in how the link shortener (Tiny.cc) generated its shortened URLs. This enabled us to identify over 200 additional targets of the same operation described in Part 1. This section describes the process used to enumerate these targets, and further describes the links between this operation and other publicly-reported Russian-linked phishing campaigns.

In September 2016, ThreatConnect published a blog post documenting phishing attempts against contributors to the citizen journalism website Bellingcat and its founder Eliot Higgins. The targeted contributors were actively engaged in reporting on the Russian involvement in the July 17, 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. ThreatConnect attributed these intrusion attempts to Fancy Bear (aka APT28), a threat actor widely believed to be directly linked to the Russian government.  In an October update to this post, ThreatConnect documented an additional spear phishing attempt against a Bellingcat contributor.

This latest credential phishing attempt was largely similar to the first email sent to David Satter (see Part 1, The Case of David Satter). Both emails were sent at 10:59am EST using the same sending address: g.mail2017[@]yandex.com. In addition, both shared a fake Gmail footer that was distinctively modified from Gmail’s original footer.

Figure 20: Footer from the phishing emails sent to Bellingcat and David Satter showing a distinctive misspelling (possibly to avoid spam filtering)

Figure 21: Footer from the phishing emails sent to Bellingcat and David Satter showing a distinctive misspelling (possibly to avoid spam filtering)

In both cases the malicious links embedded in these phishing emails were configured to redirect the targets to addresses hosted on the URL shortening service Tiny.cc. As ThreatConnect showed, the Tiny.cc link used against the Bellingcat contributor actually redirected the victim to another shortened URL, this one hosted by a different shortening service: TinyURL.com.  Ultimately, this series of link redirections led to a malicious credential phishing page hosted at the following URL:

hxxp://myaccount.google.com-changepassword-securitypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin.id833[.]ga

Table 1: Domain hosting the credential phishing page

Using PassiveTotal, we examined the historic DNS resolution data for this domain name.  The results revealed that at the time of these phishing attempts, the domain id833[.]ga resolved to IP address 89.40.181[.]119 – the same Romanian IP address used to access David Satter’s email account on October 7 (see Part 1, The Case of David Satter).

This evidence suggests that the Bellingcat contributor and David Satter were both targeted by the same spear phishing campaign; this linkage will be explored further in the next section.

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