The principal message is that the US late Cold War era policy of using any and every radio-frequency emission an enemy makes to geolocate and ident assets have been absorbed and implemented by the Russians, with a particular focus on exploitation of an opponent’s civil assets like cellphones, WiFi etc. for psywar/IW, EW and simple targeting and kill assessment. All spelled out below.
If it works for the Russians, the Chinese will emulate it exactly.
Punchline is simple, practice EMCON/LPI/LPD or travel home in a bodybag.
The tactics of Russian EW formations in the battle of Debaltsevo. “IP” Analytics
05/01/2017 – 11:00
Debaltsevo in Donbas – a traffic node of the Donetsk coal region. The city is located on the outskirts of Luhansk region has an excellent transport infrastructure, through it passes the majority of goods from this territory.
First, in 2015 the Kremlin was important to take control of the center. Direct evidence that were open declarations of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia (02.17.2015), where he openly expressed his confidence in mastering the “militia” of the area. In addition, the Russian leader called on Ukrainian military leadership to dispose lay down their arms and to save people from death.
The tactical situation around Debaltsevo created a deep ledge on one side of which are divisions of Donetsk terrorists reinforcement of regular troops of Russia, and on the other – ATO forces. By the middle of February 2015 the situation on the line of contact escalated, the Russian regular troops came close to the front line and began to impose fighting, trying to take in the Ukrainian units into envelopment and destroy them.
In this situation, the role of electronic warfare has been leading among other types of combat support. As in previous cases, the basis of electronic warfare systems were enhanced maneuverability and Group CPC EW troops of the Russian army.
A comprehensive technical monitoring group provides EW planning data center on electronic environment in the region. In addition to assessing EWw defences their funds in their range of tasks included the collection of data and the initial assessment of electronic environment. It should be noted that the CTC experts groups who have worked in the occupied regions of Ukraine have already acquired some experience and have studied the tactics of application of radio Ukrainian forces ATO.
Manoeuvring EW group in this period significantly expanded its capabilities.
Conducting military operations in the tactical area of approximately 50 × 30 km has created ideal conditions for the organization of bases for DF [Direction Finding / Geolocation] VHF and HF bands. For the technical implementation of this plan DF device used automated jamming stations. Typically, DF Base organized 2-3 jammers on armoured vehicles (R-378BMV, 330BMV P, P-934BMV , R-330ZH). The presence of the enemy DF platforms allowed him to constantly monitor the electronic environment, and create interference on detection if necessary. That is to say, in this case, electronic warfare was organized by the classical scheme of constructing order of battle group maneuver with the implementation of the algorithm of the automated cycle “radio-survey – jamming – intelligence analyis”.
Among other things, with the help of special software systems that have been used by Russian groups EW carried out a mass mailing of SMS-messages on personal mobile phones servicemen and their families. As we previously reported , similar methods of electronic warfare have been designed to create psychological pressure on the morale of the personnel of the forces ATO.
In addition, the bending positions of Ukrainian troops in Debaltsevo allowed the Russian military component EW effectively apply a set of portable radio RP-377UVM2 “Lesochek” , which could generate a barrage of interference in a small area.
It should be noted that, as in previous clashes in the Donbas, Russian military experts used the suppression of mobile GSM-communication signal delivered by the transmitter operators aerodynamically “Leer-3” interference on unmanned aerial vehicles such as “Orlan”.
However, radiation from mobile phones were widely used to cue enemy artillery to them. With the help of special software systems EW RF numbers of mobile phones Ukrainian servicemen have been identified with their owners. Being in the defense area of military units and equipment easily identified and in accordance with the determined further battle tactics. Apparently, for this reason, the enemy artillery accuracy was high – more than 50% of the Ukrainian armored vehicles at the final stage of the battle were either destroyed or put out of action. Unfortunately, the ATO forces did not use the experience from previous errors in Ilovaysk during the summer campaign, which gave advantages to the enemy in the conduct of electronic warfare.
With renewed vigor turned bck to radio-disinformtion using individual mobile phone via SMS-service. According to eyewitnesses , “the SMS could be sent by a ” faked “base station, which was located approximately within a radius of 1 km from the subscriber. This station takes bearings included all GSM transceivers (mobiles) in this area creates a mass mailing messages prepared in advance.
Thus, participating in the battles on the side of the “L-DNR” Russian troops are widely used power tools and electronic warfare as an element of combat support. According to the testimony of many witnesses, radio in the area of conducting battles in np Debaltsevo often violated. On many memories from open sources, commanders of their units in the manual often take into account the lack of / unreliable radio communications. Often, parts management and departments was carried out by using other forms of communication .
Vyacheslav Gusarov, expert on information security, TSVPI group “IP”