Russian meteorologist: Perfect weather for airstrikes

Weather in Syria is well suited to the Russian bombings.

It is reported in the weather report in the state-controlled channel Rossiya 24th

– The conditions are perfect for combat flights, says meteorologist Katerina Grigorova.


NATO called on Monday Russia to stop attacking civilians and the Syrian opposition. The first raids criticized by many for not having been directed against the terrorist group IS and the US-led military alliance called Putin “not to escalate the situation” in Syria.

“Perfect conditions”

In Russia also reported bombräderna in Syria – even the weather report.

Weatherman Katerina Grigorova, 34, offered on Saturday morning Rossiya 24 viewers photos of the bombings and a bomb forecast for the Syrian weather.

– The Russian air operation going on in Syria. According to experts, it is perfect timed, especially in terms of the weather conditions, she says in the consignment according to the Daily Mail.

– Generally, in October a good month flying.

Weatherman says there are perfect conditions for air raids but also warns that in November can be a little more difficult.

– Weather himself urges us to hurry up, says Katerina Grigorova according to the Daily Mail.

Later in the autumn risk cloud namely to cause problems with visibility, which can make combat flights, according to the weather forecast.

Then it may also cause sandstorms.

– Dust in the air can disrupt laser beams used by certain target management system, says Katerina Grigorova according to the Daily Mail.

– The US Army encountered the problem during the Gulf War. Several squadrons of F-16 was forced to return without having used its rockets and bombs.

The violation was due to the weather

On Saturday, Russian warplanes violated Turkish airspace during the operation in Syria. And Sunday was two Turkish planes of type F-16, harassed by an unidentified planes type Mig-29 for five minutes and 40 seconds, according to AFP news agency.

Violation Russia has said was due to the weather.

– The current incident was due to bad weather in the region. You should not look conspiracy theories, says Igor Konasjenkov, a Russian military spokesman, on Monday, according to CNN.


Why Are Russian Trolls Spreading Online Hoaxes In The U.S.?

There are so many coordinated Russian propaganda offensives to coincide with Ukrainian and Syrian activities that it makes getting at the truth near impossible. And this is the intent…

Russian ‘White Active Measures” are now designed to create havoc in the information space by spewing a torrent of wild accusations and allegations without any regard to the truth. This method is a departure from Soviet era Dezinformatsia techniques which always centered around a small kernel of truth, i.e., Eisenhower’s MIC speech, etc. Now the truth has been blown up.

“The main difference between propaganda in the USSR and the new Russia,” says Gleb Pavlovsky, a political consultant who worked on Putin’s election campaign and was a long-time Kremlin insider, “ is that in Soviet times the concept of truth was important. Even if they were lying they took care to prove what they were doing was ‘the truth.’ Now no one even tries proving the ‘truth.’ You can just say anything. Create realities.”

From the US State Dept: U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Minutes and Transcript for February 26, 2015 Meeting

“…Because one of the takeaways was that the Kremlin’s goal with their disinformation is just to make us all think it’s all PR, and that could be anything. And so we replied to disinformation in kind. We tried to swat down every lie that’s out there and that’s simply our strategy. We fall into their trap. Countermessaging can be at times implementing the other person’s strategy. So we’re going to keep doing that. We’re not going to give up on that fight. But we have to do a lot more. We have to document the systems of disinformation. We have to be smart about that.”

‘Irreproachable’ Air Strikes: Russian Media Spin The Syria Offensive

A woman watches a news program showing Russian President Vladimir Putin making a statement about the Syria situation in St. Petersburg on September 30.

By Tom Balmforth

MOSCOW — Russia may have taken the world by surprise when it launched air strikes in Syria, but the media back home in Moscow were more than ready.

By early evening on September 30, hours after the first bombs dropped, prominent pro-Kremlin TV personality Vladimir Solovyov was hosting a “special” two-hour session of his Evening show on state-run Channel One to explain it all to a primetime audience.

“The only foreign power in Syria to provide military support in line with the law is the Russian Federation,” Solovyov told the country in his opening remarks, implicitly condemning the U.S.-led coalition in Syria.

For 18 months, Kremlin-controlled TV had been focused on feeding Russians propaganda about the conflict in Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin’s standoff with the West.

But Putin’s September 28 speech at the UN General Assembly and the start of the air strikes accompanied a grand shift in the narrative. Nowhere was that switch more apparent than on Solovyov’s show: Ukraine was rarely mentioned, and when it was, it was more like an old joke remembered with a knowing smile.

TV host Vladimir SolovyovTV host Vladimir Solovyov

Laced with anti-Americanism, the show also gave little airtime to the uproar from Syrian rebels, activists and Western officials who made claims — denied by Moscow — that Russia’s “pinpoint” strikes had actually hit locations not under IS control, in some cases killing civilians.

State Duma security committee chief Irina Yarovaya praised the military action as a part of what she called Putin’s “uncompromising” campaign against “terrorism” — a preemptive strike to stop Islamic State (IS) militants from one day training their guns on Russia.

“The United States is playing a virtual game with a joystick, making war and peace, but this is real life for us, the real security of our citizens,” said Yarovaya to applause from the audience.

Presiding coolly in all-black garb evoking a martial-arts master, Solovyov chipped in with a piece of information that seemed meant to bring the Syrian conflict closer to home and justify Moscow’s biggest military intervention outside the ex-Soviet Union since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan: The distance between Russia and Syria is the same as the distance between Moscow and St. Petersburg.

This Is War

Ultranationalist writer Aleksandr Prokhanov entered the discussion with a challenge for “our liberal opponents.”

“Surely they realize that if ISIS reaches the Caucasus, then a third Caucasus war is inevitable?” asked Prokhanov, referring to two devastating wars pitting the Kremlin against Chechen rebels.

Aleksandr ProkhanovAleksandr Prokhanov

His remarks and Solovyov’s both echoed Putin’s statement earlier in the day that terrorists and militants must be destroyed before they “come to us.”

A key source of friction in Syria between Russia and the United States is the fate of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who Washington says “drops barrel bombs on innocent children” and must leave power in a “managed transition.”

Moscow says Assad’s government is key to the fight against IS — a line that was pushed hard by Yevgeny Satanovsky, a Middle East analyst who appeared as a panelist on the Evening show.

“Russia is coordinating its action with the people fighting terrorism, while the greater part of the counterterrorism coalition led by the United States is today financing and organizing war in Syria, supporting those same terrorists.”

“How can we understand the Americans? I fear we can’t,” he said.

“But do we need to understand them?” Solovyov questioned.

The air strikes were presaged by an abrupt but lavishly covered parliament vote granting Putin permission to use the Russian military in Syria.

But even in Russia, the first news breaks came from U.S. and Middle Eastern news outlets, while the domestic media seemed slow to get the story — a point of frustration for observers like Moscow-based blogger Filipp Kireyev.

“Reuters and CNN are writing in caps about Russia’s air strikes against ISIS, but our media is silent. Are we now going to learn everything from the Americans?”

But soon the Russian newspapers and websites caught up.

By late afternoon, pro-Kremlin daily Izvestia ran an opinion column on its website praising the Kremlin for stepping into the breach in the Middle East, blaming the chaos in the Middle East entirely on the West and quoting Putin on the West’s Middle East policy: “Now do you understand the mess you’ve made?”

“Syria Looks With Hope To The Skies: Russian Planes Hit Terrorist Positions,” ran popular tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda’s headline, accompanying a gritty report on the “antipropaganda” effort from a command center filled with tobacco smoke where officers disseminate pro-Damascus propaganda online from computer stations.

In seeking support for the air strikes, the Russian media did not have to rely solely on Russian sources.

On October 1, sensationalist news site LifeNews latched onto comments in which Republican U.S. presidential hopeful Donald Trump said he sided with “the group that says, ‘If Russia wants to go and fight ISIS, you should let them.’”

On the Solovyov show, Russian lawmaker Aleksei Aleksandrov told the country that “legal irreproachability” was a crucial aspects of the air strikes.

Aleksandrov said that Assad’s formal request of military support gave the action legitimacy — a rationale that has been emphasized by the Kremlin and attacked by analysts such as Sam Greene, director of the Russian Institute at King’s College London.

“So, if [Ukrainian President Petro] Poroshenko asks Obama to bomb rebel positions in Donbas, that would be just fine with Putin, presumably,” Greene wrote on Twitter.

Satanovsky suggested that Russia is up against more than militants in Syria, portraying the United States and other countries as contract killers trying to take out Assad.

“We have a problem: They are being honest,” he said of Western nations that have called for Assad’s exit. “An honest killer must carry out the hit, even more so if it’s paid. There was an order to kill Assad. France, Australia, and United States tried their best to fulfill it. But then suddenly we showed up.”

At this point, Solovyov cut him off with a comment that won loud applause.

“We’re also honest,” he reassured Russians. “We say: ‘Nuh-uh, we won’t allow that to happen.”

For all the frenzied focus on Syria after the air strikes began, some outlets seemed to play down the story the following day — suggesting, perhaps, that Russia’s big military foray in the Middle East is just part of a day’s work for Putin.

The top story on Izvestia’s website on October 1: Russia may impose a tax on picnickers grilling shashlyk, or shish kebab.


Seven Strategies Of Domestic Russian Propaganda

Article by: Kseniya Kirillova

An important attribute of Russia’s modern policy has been the growth in military hysteria and the constant need for both internal and external enemies. The increase in aggression and belligerence among the population was also not implemented in one fell swoop: rather, it was cultivated over a period of several years, although its apogee was reached with the advent of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

Here follows an overview of the main strategies and methods with which Russian propaganda obtains its desired results:

1) To weaken critical thinking

The most cynical means are used to achieve this result. Propaganda employs methods of psychological manipulation which are designed to reduce dramatically, if not to block entirely, the ability of critical thinking on the part of the viewer or listener through an appeal to his or her feelings. Hatred is not necessarily always the feeling sought.  Propaganda actively exploits the feeling of pity: in so doing, it plays not only on the worst but also on the best human instincts. It does so, for example, by showing ruined residential buildings in the Donbass, or children who are suffering from the effects of war. In propaganda, there is no hesitation to resort to open lies: it is sufficient to recall the story about “crucified boys,” purportedly macerated by the Ukrainian army, and other similar subjects.

The characteristic that distinguishes propaganda from regular reporting is that the person who is experiencing feelings of pity, pain, fear or “righteous anger” is not given the opportunity to think rationally about the subject that has elicited such feelings. He or she is given a prepared response, and a prepared image of the enemy – “punishers,” a “junta” and the Americans who back it, “destroyers of the civilian population.” More often than not, Russians are slipped a veritable cocktail of emotions intended to block the very ability to think during the time it takes to process the information. Examples are the horror of war, pity for the victims, fear that can reach proportions of panic, and the dread of an impending military threat.

2) To create an image of the enemy

When a person has been mentally prepared, he or she is then given an answer to the internal unspoken and not yet understood question about who is responsible for the pain and fear into which he or she has been plunged. The image of the enemy in Russian propaganda is not distinguished by its originality, and has been forming in varying degrees of intensity over the past few years. Of course, it is the USA, and those who the propagandists call “American puppets,” beginning with the Ukrainian authorities and ending with the whole of Western and Eastern Europe.

3) To link all internal problems to external factors

As noted above,  by adopting the official foreign policy rhetoric, the average person compensates for his or her own helplessness through the illusion of involvement in historical events and a link to the abstraction called “Russia.” Understanding the essence of foreign problems is far more complicated for the average person than understanding domestic issues. More often than not, such Russians have never been abroad, and do not know the actual attitudes of western countries. For this reason, such Russians are easily subject to manipulation, in this case leading them to blame external enemies for their own problems.

4) To emphasize the consolidation of society in the face of a military threat

Once again, this is done at different levels and with different connotations, ranging from aggressive calls to fight against the “national traitors” to constructive attempts to unite people in order to solve problems, but only in the case of their total approval of the foreign policy of the authorities.

5) To create the image of Vladimir Putin as the only leader capable of withstanding the military threat

I don’t think any further explanation is needed here: much has been said and written about the contemporary cult of personality surrounding Putin. Its apogee is represented by the film “President.”

6) To prepare for the inevitable hardships of “wartime”

Plunging the consciousness of the population into an endless militaristic hell and frightened them with the constant specter of imminent war (including  nuclear war) makes it possible to justify any hardship or deterioration in the economic situation in the eyes of the population. The threat of an impending nightmare will make people accept any other deprivation as a “lesser evil,” or as a sacrifice that must be made to avoid war.

7) To create an image for the West of a united Russia ready for war

This is a technique worth noting separately. Of course, the work of influencing a foreign audience is left to specialized media such as RT or “Sputnik,” though “domestic” propaganda can have this as a secondary aim.

These processes yield a number of consequences for Russian society. In particular, there is more than ever a high need for enemies,” both for justifying the hardships that are being experienced, and in order that people may take part in immoral activity simply through passively approving of it.

In fact, war is the main element which provides the opportunity for the authorities to influence society in contemporary Russia. It is the horrors of war that are capable of undermining critical thinking on the part of individuals, and it is with the help of war that the image of the enemy is being created and that a cult of personality is forming around Putin: it is war that underpins the consolidation of Russian society, and it is war that explains the hardships which are only destined to grow given the Russian economic crisis. This means that the Kremlin has finally found itself caught in a trap: it cannot stop the war, nor can it turn off the destructive television channel.


Waging a Proxy War on Russian Journalism

Carlo Allegri / Reuters

October 01, 2015

Much has been said since 2014 about Russia’s proxy war in Ukraine, where Russian troops and equipment are often reported and even sometimes captured, but with official Moscow staunchly denying involvement. However, this is not the only proxy war that the Kremlin is — or appears to be — waging; there are other campaigns, some of which are longer and more effective, simply because they are less noticeable.

One particular target is the Russian media. “The links of the goddamn chain” became a short-lived meme in the Russian journalistic community during the opposition protests of 2011-13, used to explain an odd string of reshuffles and closures at a handful of prominent outlets popular with the protesters. But like most memes, it was based on anecdotal evidence and pointed out the dots without connecting them — while the chain was still being forged.

In an article for the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford, published last week, I make an attempt to connect the dots on the Russian media market, arguing that there is in fact an ongoing campaign against independent-minded publications in Russia, clearly benefiting the Kremlin but never traced back to it directly — a hands-off approach that has, indeed, much in common with what critics say about Russian military involvement in Ukraine.

Until recently, the Russian media existed in an odd dual state not surprising, perhaps, for a country with a double-headed eagle for an emblem. On the one hand, President Vladimir Putin kicked off his reign back in 2000 by subduing all major television channels and turning them into publicity vehicles for the Kremlin. But on the other hand, a robust “second tier” of websites, newspapers and magazines thrived in the shadow of the state media giants, offering a wide spectrum of stances and opinions, as well as plenty of criticism — ignored because it was never enough to sway an election.

But then the inevitable happened: The “second-tier” media became an electoral factor during the last election cycle in 2011-12, largely due to explosive growth of the Internet in Russia. During the opposition protests of the time, the biggest since 1993, publications such as and the respected Kommersant daily gave voice to the concerns of the angry educated urbanites who rallied — unsuccessfully — against Putin’s return to the Kremlin and the corrupt, inefficient bureaucracy that he was associated with.

Unsurprisingly, the president was not pleased — and then came the backlash.

My research shows that out of the 10 most popular media outlets that offered a critical or at least independent outlook at the start of the protests, seven have come under attack since 2011 (, Kommersant, Vedomosti, Dozhd TV,, Ekho Moskvy and RIA Novosti). Another six publications with smaller audiences, but well-established reputations, were also hit (Bolshoi Gorod, the Nedelya news program at Ren-TV,,, and

One prominent clampdown tactic was forced editor change (six publications). In all cases, the editorial reshuffles were conducted by the publications’ owners — either prominent businessmen, who, as the Khodorkovsky case showed, are utterly dependent on the government’s goodwill, or the state, directly or through state media holdings applying pressure to publications striving for impartiality instead of sycophancy (RIA Novosti, Marianna Maximovskaya’s Nedelya show at the Gazprom-owned Ren-TV). Little or no explanation was offered in all cases — the reshuffles and closures just happened. If pressed, owners denied political motives.

The second tactic was direct governmental crackdowns (seven publications), which were conducted in an intricate fashion. There was — is — no unified form for state meddling: It can be direct bans, license withdrawal, denial of distribution or ownership change. But what all those cases have in common is the reasoning, which, unlike in the first case, is direct and vocal — all publications in this group were accused of moral transgressions.

This includes extremism, profanity, pro-Western affiliation (Vedomosti) or, most notoriously, crimes against history, as with Dozhd TV, accused of smearing the memory of World War II veterans by asking a question about the Siege of Leningrad that the veterans have themselves been asking for a long time.

State involvement does not equal Kremlin involvement here. Moral allegations are always put forward by nominally independent lawmakers and activists, or lesser state agencies such as the media watchdog Roskomnadzor. The presidential administration was always able to distance itself from these actors, despite their obvious dependence on the Kremlin.

Also, in no case was political censorship directly mentioned by the perpetrators — but it happened nevertheless. A case study comparing coverage by, which received a pro-Kremlin editor and staff last year, and Riga-based Meduza, founded by former Lenta journalists, showed that the pro-Kremlin team axed the publication’s previously extensive coverage of human rights in Russia, an evergreen and dismal topic (down from 6 to 1 percent of all content after the reshuffle, while at 12 percent at Meduza as of spring 2015) and greatly boosted its focus on Putin, who now enjoys much more positive coverage from Lenta than ever before, according to sentiment analysis of monthlong coverage samples.

Putin is now the second-most popular headline keyword at, but he did not make the top 10 of keywords at either the old Lenta or Meduza.

Not everyone has been affected so far: Five prominent independent and/or critical-minded outlets dodged large-scale harassment. Key reasons for slipping under the radar appear to be primarily economic coverage (RBC, Forbes Russia), lack of original content ( or small size coupled with strong reputation (Meduza, Novaya Gazeta), which makes the cost-benefit balance of a crackdown just not worth it.

Also, while authoritarian practice worldwide offers a wide range of tools for press clampdowns, not all of them are used in Russia. Two of the most prominent absentees are economic pressure and direct violence. While no clear-cut explanation exists, it may be argued that the former would have negative economic consequences if applied on a large scale, sending the press market into uproar and scaring off big advertisers, many of them global corporations.

The latter, meanwhile, is just too damaging for the government’s reputation — the Kremlin or its affiliates are already blamed for every instance of political violence in Russia regardless of their actual involvement or endorsement thereof.

The Kremlin is also active in counter-propaganda, taking on independent publications with pro-government media outlets, but those either cannot match the opposition rivals on audience (,, or, even if successful like LifeNews and the Izvestia newspaper, fail to reach the opposition audience, which simply ignores them, unless it is to ridicule them on Facebook.

All of this combines into a campaign where the Kremlin is never, or rarely, implicated directly, but emerges as the main beneficiary of a long string of incidents that, miraculously, only happen to its critics. One problem here is that the campaign is still ongoing — Forbes Russia had to change ownership due to new restrictive legislation this month, and RBC boasts a warning from Roskomnadzor and saw a journalist arrested in July on highly dubious charges.

But the Russian “proxy media war” has implications far beyond any domestic publications, however high-quality and popular. A hands-off approach to censorship, where state harassment is outsourced to governmental clients and hangers-on, and disguised as business disputes or defense of the morals, is a highly efficient suppression tool in an age of what is already dubbed “informational dictatorships.” It simply does less reputational damage than, for example, China’s notorious head-on banning and bludgeoning.

The Russian proxy war works so well that Putin’s colleagues across the world would be fools not to take a page out of his book. That is, unless new steps are made to protect the ever-vulnerable media from the increasingly intricate meddling by leaders who prefer silence to dialogue.

By Alexey Eremenko, The Moscow Times

Alexey Eremenko is a Reuters fellow and former correspondent for The Moscow Times


So This Is ‘Putin’s Propaganda TV’?

Margarita Simonyan

October 05, 2015

A look at how RT’s chief editor responds to evidence that the network is a political failure

The Kremlin’s flagship news network abroad, RT (formerly known as Russia Today), is having a rough go of things this month. Last week,The Daily Beast revealed a study from 2013 claiming that “Putin’s propaganda TV” exaggerates its popularity online and on the airwaves. The report was leaked by Vasily Gatov, a disaffected former employee of the now-defunct news outlet RIA Novosti—the older, more professional brother in Russia’s state-funded media family (who was disowned and dissolved in late 2013). The study claims that RT‘s massive budget (about $2 billion between 2005 and 2013), which is supposed to fund the promotion of “the Russian point of view on key international issues,” is largely wasted on a TV station few people watch. Following the publication of these claims, Margarita Simonyan, the 35-year-old chief editor of RT and its parent company Rossiya Segodnya, fired back with an angry blog post on LiveJournal, where she defended her network’s efficacy as a news media outlet and lashed out at RT‘s detractors. Meduza‘s Kevin Rothrock looks at Simonyan’s response to the people who say her propaganda mission has failed.

Just a bunch of sore losers and neocons

Simonyan says she was first contacted by The Daily Beast earlier this summer. Claiming to have been “amused,” she says the report leaked to the Americans was likely the “latest ploy” by RIA Novosti‘s final chief editor, Svetlana Mironyuk, whom Simonyan calls a lover of “complex and largely useless intrigues.”

Simonyan insists that there is statistical evidence to prove RT‘s genuine mass appeal. “We order studies of our audience from the most respected American and European companies and we don’t publish a word of this research without first agreeing with them,” she says. Simonyan also argues that one would have to believe YouTube and Google were in cahoots with RT, in order to think claims about its online popularity are exaggerated.

Lamenting the tension with RIA Novosti‘s old staff, Simonyan writes, “It’s a shame when years-old intrigues haunt some people to the degree that they can’t stop themselves from starting and inflating scandals through the tabloid, anti-Russian press in America.” Simonyan holds in especially low regard Michael Weiss, a neoconservative senior editor at The Daily Beast, whom she calls “one of the most successful career russophobes,” who “rose quickly by dumping on Russia and RT.”

The “Russian perspective,” complete with meteorites and Japanese earthquakes

Trying to refute claims that RT‘s YouTube audience comes mostly for disaster footage, Simonyan cites a study by the Pew Research Center emphasizing that the number of views attracted by RT‘s YouTube videos is “far greater than many other well-known sources.” This was never in question, however, though subsequent articles in the Russian press have called attention to the possibility that RT buys views to inflate its traffic.

What Simonyan does not point out about the Pew report is that it actually supports one of the main claims of the leaked RIA Novosti study: namely that “most of Russia Today’s popular videos (68 percent) were not edited news packages in any traditional sense,” but “first-person video accounts of dramatic worldwide events such as the Japanese earthquake.” In other words, RT doesn’t seem to be winning an audience for its on-message content—it’s mission—which Simonyan has described in the past as “giving the Russian point of view on key international issues.”

While the Pew study (conducted in 2012) and the RIA Novosti report (finished in 2013) seem to complement one another, Simonyan cites athird text that appeared in The Washington Post by Robert Orttung, Elizabeth Nelson, and Anthony Livshen of George Washington University. This latter research, carried out in early 2015 (after the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea by Russia), suggests that RT is indeed enjoying some success in appealing to foreign audiences with its Ukraine coverage, though the popularity of its content fluctuates radically with the news cycle. Also, Europeans showed more interest in Ukraine than Americans—not unsurprisingly, given that the Ukrainian crisis unfolded in Europe.

Even the work by Orttung and his team, however, comes to conclusions like this one: “Apparently, the Kremlin has decided that selling Americans on the Kremlin-sanctioned view of the conflict in Ukraine is too challenging a task even for the experienced Kremlin media merchants.”

The unpublished data would blow your mind, probably

When challenging claims that RT exaggerates its television ratings with broad, often questionable interpretations of survey data, Simonyan cites an RT article summarizing a study by Nielsen that supposedly shows RT doubling its audience in seven US cities between May 2014 and March 2014. Critics have expressed doubts about this Nielsen study, however, pointing out that it is strangely unpublished. The same is true of another Nielsen survey Simonyan cites to show the supposedly fast-growing popularity of RT‘s Arabic-language service in the Middle East and North Africa.

Simonyan never addresses the criticism that RT owes its popularity to reports that have little or nothing to do with the network’s political mission. For instance, RIA Novosti‘s research said RT‘s most-watched segments are about “metrosexuals, bums, and earthquakes.” In her response on LiveJournal, Simonyan simply points out that RT‘s traffic is vastly superior to all other television networks on YouTube.

Simonyan also does not respond to those who say RT buys its popularity by broadcasting content that it didn’t record itself. In fact, the Pew study she mentions as proof of RT‘s success on YouTube says this: “The people who shot these videos may not be Russia Todayreporters, but the organization acquired the footage and broadcast it, using its own dissemination tools and graphics.”

“A quite efficient scheme”

After presenting her case in defense of RT, Simonyan finishes by alluding to the sinister alliance she detects between American neoconservatives, the US government, and the Russian opposition. In screenshots, she shows how Will Stevens, the spokesperson for the US embassy in Russia, tweeted a link to The Daily Beast story. Soon following suit was opposition leader Alexey Navalny, who was retweeted by former chess grandmaster and oppositionist-in-exile Garry Kasparov, and also by none other than The Daily Beast‘s own Michael Weiss. “It’s a quite efficient scheme for dispersing information,” Simonyan concludes.

By Kevin Rothrock, Meduza


Russia Claims To Have Killed 3,753 People In One Day

Today’s Russian report on the number of people killed in Syria, for 5 October, 2015, from Dr. Igor Panarin, Russian Foreign Ministry:

(Translated by my Chrome browser)

Syria: Lost LIH terrorist attacks on Russian aircraft from September 30 to October 5, 2015 (Update)

– 9366 people (killed, wounded, missing and deserters) – about 50% loss of the terrorists is the deserters fleeing Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.
– 13 command control centers.
– 10 ammunition depots.
– 5 field terrorist training camps.
– 5 fuel storage.
– 5 knots of communication.
– Disguised database terrorists
– Center for special training militants
– Field ammunition depot
– 4 hopper.
– 19 T-55 tanks
– 19 BMP.
– 18 BTR
– 3 tools
– 16 cars.
– 4 mini-factory for the production of weapons for terrorists
– 3avod for the production of land mines and explosive devices
– Workshop for manufacturing explosive devices for terrorists

Yesterday’s report, 4 October 2015:

Syria: Lost LIH terrorist attacks on Russian aircraft from September 30 to October 4, 2015

– 5613 people (killed, wounded, missing and deserters).
– 11 command control centers.
– 7 magazine.
– 5 field of terrorist training camps.
– 4 fuel storage.
– 4 communications center.
– Center for special training militants
– 4 hopper.
– 19 BMP.
– 13 armored personnel carriers.
– 4 mini-factory for the production of weapons for terrorists
– 3avod for the production of bombs and explosives
– Workshop for the production of explosive devices for terrorists

9,366 – 5,613 = 3,753 Syrians killed by the Russians in one day.  The rate of killing is consistently increasing.  Today 3,753, yesterday was 2,488, the day previous was 1,477.

Men, women, children, FSA, ISIS, civilian, military?

The same cautions apply, Dr. Panarin’s numbers are usually way off, inflated for shock and awe, apparently.  This is as close to an official body count as you will see from Russia.

Am I the only one reporting this?